Fair Performance Metric Elicitation by Hiranandani, Gaurush et al.
Fair Performance Metric Elicitation
Gaurush Hiranandani
UIUC
gaurush2@illinois.edu
Harikrishna Narasimhan
Google Research
hnarasimhan@google.com
Oluwasanmi Koyejo
UIUC & Google Research Accra
sanmi@illinois.edu
June 24, 2020
Abstract
What is a fair performance metric? We consider the choice of fairness metrics through
the lens of metric elicitation – a principled framework for selecting performance metrics
that best reflect implicit preferences. The use of metric elicitation enables a practitioner
to tune the performance and fairness metrics to the task, context, and population at hand.
Specifically, we propose a novel strategy to elicit fair performance metrics for multiclass
classification problems with multiple sensitive groups that also includes selecting the
trade-off between performance and fairness. The proposed elicitation strategy requires
only relative preference feedback and is robust to both finite sample and feedback noise.
1 Introduction
Machine learning models are increasingly employed for critical decision-making tasks such as
hiring and sentencing [38, 3, 9, 12, 26]. Yet, it is increasingly evident that automated decision-
making is susceptible to bias, whereby decisions made by the algorithm are unfair to certain
subgroups [5, 3, 8, 7, 26]. To this end, a wide variety of group fairness metrics have been proposed
– all to reduce discrimination and bias from automated decision-making [21, 11, 14, 24, 41, 27].
However, a dearth of formal principles for selecting the most appropriate metric has highlighted
the confusion of experts, practitioners, and end users in deciding which group fairness metric
to employ [45]. This is further exacerbated by the observation that common metrics often lead
to contradictory outcomes [24].
While the problem of selecting an appropriate fairness metric has gained prominence in recent
years [14, 27, 45], it perhaps best understood as a special case of the task of choosing evaluation
metrics in machine learning. For instance, when a cost-sensitive predictive model classifies
patients into cancer categories [42] even without considering fairness, it is often unclear how
the cost-tradeoffs be chosen so that they reflect the expert’s decision-making, i.e., replacing
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Figure 1: Framework of Metric Elicitation [16].
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Figure 2: R1×· · ·×Rm (best seen in colors);
Ru ∀u ∈ [m] are convex sets with common
vertices ei ∀ i ∈ [k] and enclose the sphere Sρ.
expert intuition by quantifiable metrics. The recently proposed Metric Elicitation (ME)
framework [16, 17] provides a solution. ME is a principled framework for eliciting performance
metrics using only relative preference feedback over classifiers from an end user (oracle). The
motivation behind ME is that employing the performance metrics which reflect user tradeoffs
will enable learning models that best capture user preferences [16]. Figure 1 (reproduced
from [16]) illustrates the ME framework.
Existing research suggests a fundamental trade-off between algorithmic fairness and perfor-
mance [21, 43, 9, 6, 27, 45], where in addition to appropriate metrics, the practitioner or
policymaker must choose a trade-off operating point between the competing objectives [45].
To this end, we extend the ME framework from eliciting multiclass classification metrics [17] to
the task of eliciting fair performance metrics from pairwise preference feedback in the presence
of multiple sensitive groups. In particular, we elicit metrics that reflect, jointly, the (i) predic-
tive performance evaluated as a weighting of classifier’s overall predictive rates, (ii) fairness
violation assessed as the discrepancy in predictive rates among groups, and (iii) a trade-off
between the predictive performance and fairness violation. Importantly, the elicited metrics
are sufficiently flexible to encapsulate and generalize many existing predictive performance
and fairness violation measures.
In eliciting group-fair performance metrics, we tackle three challenges as compared to existing
work on ME. First, from preference query perspective, the predictive performance and fairness
violations are correlated, thus increasing the complexity of joint elicitation. Second, we find
that in order to measure both positive and negative violations, the fair metrics are necessarily
non-linear functions of the predictive rates, thus existing results on linear ME [17] cannot be
applied directly. Finally, as we show, the number of groups directly impacts query complexity.
We overcome these challenges by proposing a novel query efficient procedure that exploits the
geometric properties of the set of rates.
Contributions. We consider metrics for algorithmically group-fair classification, and propose
a novel approach for eliciting predictive performance, fairness violations, and their trade-off
point, from expert pairwise feedback. Our procedure uses binary-search based subroutines and
recovers the metric with linear query complexity. Moreover, the procedure is robust to both
finite sample and oracle feedback noise thus is useful in practice. Lastly, our method can be
applied either by querying preferences over classifiers or rates. Such an equivalence is crucial
for practical applications [16, 17].
Notation. Matrices and vectors are denoted by bold upper case and bold lower case letters,
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respectively. We denote the inner product of two vectors by 〈·, ·〉 and the Hadamard product
by . The `∞-norm and `2-norm are denoted by ‖·‖∞ and ‖·‖2, respectively. For k ∈ Z+, we
represent the index set {1, 2, · · · , k} by [k], and the (k − 1)-dimensional simplex by ∆k. Given
a matrix A, off -diag(A) returns a vector of off-diagonal elements of A in row-major form.
The group membership is denoted by superscripts and coordinates of vectors, matrices, and
tuples are denoted by subscripts.
2 Background
The standard multiclass, multigroup classification setting comprises k classes and m groups
with X ∈ X , G ∈ [m] and Y ∈ [k] representing the input, group membership, and output
random variables, respectively. The groups are assumed to be disjoint. We have access to a
dataset of size n denoted by {(x, g, y)i}ni=1, generated iid from a distribution P(X,G, Y ). For
each group g ∈ [m], let ζgi := P(Y = i|G = g) for i ∈ [k] be the group-conditional probability
of each of the k classes, and κg := P(G = g) denote the probability that any instance belongs
to the group g. The unconditional probability of class i is given by ζi := P(Y = i), where
clearly ζi =
∑
g κ
gζgi .
Predictive rates: We consider a (randomized) classifier hg : X → ∆k for each group g, and use
Hg = {hg : X → ∆k} to denote the set of all classifiers for group g. The group-conditional rate
matrix for a classifier hg is denoted by Rg(hg,P) ∈ Rk×k, where its elements are defined as:
Rgij(h
g,P) := P(hg = j|Y = i, G = g) for i, j ∈ [k]. (1)
We also define the overall classifier h : (X , [m])→ ∆k by h(x, g) := hg(x) and represent the
set of all overall classifiers by H. The rate matrix for the overall classifier h is then given by:
Rij := P(h = j|Y = i) =
∑m
g=1
T gijR
g
ij, (2)
where, for a group g, we have defined a group contribution matrix Tg as T gij := κgζ
g
i /ζi ∀ i, j ∈
[k]. Notice that the predictive rates satisfy the following useful decomposition:
Rgii(h
g,P) = 1−
∑k
j=1,j 6=i
Rgij(h
g,P). (3)
Using this any rate matrix is uniquely represented by its q := (k2 − k) off-diagonal elements
as a vector rg(hg,P) = off -diag(Rg(hg,P)). So we will interchangeably refer to the rate
matrix as a ‘vector of rates’. The set of rates associated with a group g is denoted by
Rg = {rg(hg,P) : hg ∈ Hg}. For clarity, we will suppress the dependence on P and hg if it is
clear from the context.
Lastly, let r1:m := (r1, . . . , rm) ∈ R1 × · · · × Rm =: R1:m denote the tuple of rates for the m
groups for the overall classifier h, then its rates from (2) can now be succinctly written as
r =
∑m
g=1 τ
g  rg, where τ g := off -diag(Tg). Note that ∑mg=1 τ g = 1, where 1 is a vector of
ones.
Fairness violation measure: The (approximate) fairness of a classifier is often determined by
the ‘discrepancy’ in rates across different groups e.g. equalized odds [14, 4]. So given two
groups u, v ∈ [m], we define the discrepancy in their rates as:
duv := |ru − rv|. (4)
Since there are m groups, the number of discrepancy vectors are M :=
(
m
2
)
.
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2.1 Fair Performance Metric
We aim to elicit a general class of metrics, which recovers and generalizes existing fairness
measures, based on trade-off between predictive performance and fairness violation [21, 14, 8,
6, 27]. Let φ : [0, 1]q → R be the cost of overall misclassification (aka. predictive performance)
and ϕ : [0, 1]m×q → R be the fairness violation cost for a classifier h determined by the overall
rates r(h) and group discrepancies {duv(h)}mu,v=1,v>u, respectively. Without loss of generality
(wlog), we assume the metrics φ and ϕ are costs. Moreover, the metrics are scale invariant
as global scale does not affect the learning problem [31]; hence let φ : [0, 1]q → [0, 1] and
ϕ : [0, 1]m×q → [0, 1].
Definition 1. Fair Performance Metric: Let φ and ϕ be monotonically increasing linear
functions of overall rates and group discrepancies, respectively. The fair metric Ψ is a trade-off
between φ and ϕ. In particular, given a ∈ Rq, a ≥ 0 (misclassification weights), a set of vectors
B := {buv ∈ Rq,buv ≥ 0}mu,v=1,v>u (fairness violation weights), and a scalar λ (trade-off) with
‖a‖2 = 1,
∑m
u,v=1,v>u
‖buv‖2 = 1, 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, (5)
(wlog., due to scale invariance), we define the metric Ψ as:
Ψ(r1:m ; a,B, λ) := (1− λ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
trade-off
〈a, r〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ(r)
+λ
(∑m
u,v=1,v>u
〈buv,duv〉
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ϕ(r1:m)
. (6)
Examples of the misclassification cost φ(r) include cost-sensitive linear metrics [1]. Many
existing fairness metrics for two classes and two groups such as equal opportunity [14], balance
for the negative class [24] error-rate balance (i.e., 0.5|r11 − r21| + 0.5|r12 − r22|) [8], weighted
equalized odds (i.e., b1|r11 − r21| + b2|r12 − r22|) [14, 6], etc. correspond to fairness violations
of the form ϕ(r1:m) considered above. The combination of φ(r) and ϕ(r1:m) as defined in
Ψ(r1:m) appears regularly in prior work [21, 6, 27]. Notice that the metric is flexible to allow
different fairness violation costs for different pairs of groups thus capable of enabling reverse
discrimination [33]. Lastly, while the metric is linear with respect to (wrt.) the discrepancies,
it is non-linear wrt. the group-wise rates. Hence, standard linear ME algorithm [17] cannot be
trivially applied for eliciting the metric in Definition 1.
2.2 Fair Performance Metric Elicitation; Problem Statement
We now state the problem of Fair Performance Metric Elicitation (FPME) and define the
associated oracle query. The broad definitions follow from Hiranandani et al. [16, 17], ex-
tended so the rates and the performance metrics correspond to the multiclass multigroup-fair
classification setting.
Definition 2 (Oracle Query). Given two classifiers h1, h2 (equivalent to a tuple of rates
r1:m1 , r
1:m
2 respectively), a query to the Oracle (with metric Ψ) is represented by:
Γ(h1, h2 ; Ψ) = Ω
(
r1:m1 , r
1:m
2 ; Ψ
)
= 1[Ψ(r1:m1 ) > Ψ(r
1:m
2 )], (7)
where Γ : H×H → {0, 1} and Ω : R1:m ×R1:m → {0, 1}. In words, the query asks whether h1
is preferred to h2 (equivalent to whether r1:m1 is preferred to r1
:m
2 ), as measured by Ψ.
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Notice that the oracle responds by comparing the arguments of Ψ, which is unknown to us
and can be accessed only through queries to the oracle Ω(·, · ; Ψ). The metrics we consider
are functions of rates, thus comparison queries using classifiers are indistinguishable from
comparison queries using rates. Henceforth, we denote any query as a rate-based query. Next,
we formally state the FPME problem.
Definition 3 (Fair Performance Metric Elicitation with Pairwise Queries (given {(x, g, y)i}ni=1)).
Suppose that the oracle’s (unknown) performance metric is Ψ. Using oracle queries of the form
Ω(rˆ1:m1 , rˆ
1:m
2 ; Ψ), where rˆ1
:m
1 , rˆ
1:m
2 are the estimated rates from samples, recover a metric Ψˆ
such that ‖Ψ− Ψˆ‖ < ω under a suitable norm ‖ · ‖ for sufficiently small error tolerance ω > 0.
Similar to the standard metric elicitation problems [16, 17], the performance of FPME is
evaluated both by the fidelity of the recovered metric and the query complexity. As done in
decision theory literature [25, 16], we present our FPME solution by first assuming access to
population quantities such as the population rates r1:m(h,P), and then discuss how elicitation
can be performed from finite samples, e.g., with empirical rates rˆ1:m(h, {(x, g, y)i}ni=1)).
2.3 Standard Linear Performance Metric Elicitation – Warmup
We revisit the linear metric elicitation procedure proposed in [17]. The procedure assumes
an enclosed sphere S ⊂ Z, where Z is the q-dimensional space of classifier statistics that
are feasible, i.e., can be achieved by some classifier. We will use this linear metric elicitation
as a subroutine when we consider the more complicated setting defined in Definition 1. Let
the oracle’s scale invariant, monotonically increasing metric be ξ(z) := 〈a, z〉, such that
‖a‖2 = 1, a ≥ 0, analogous to the misclassification cost in Definition 1. Analogously, the oracle
queries are Ω (z1, z2 ; ξ) := 1[ξ(z1) > ξ(z2)].
Algorithm 2 in [17] is a coordinate-wise binary search algorithm that takes the query space S,
binary-search tolerance , and the oracle Ω(·, · ; ξ) as input, and by querying O(q log(pi/2))
queries recovers a metric aˆ with ‖aˆ‖2 = 1, aˆ ≥ 0 such that ‖a − aˆ‖2 ≤ O(√q) (Theorem 2
in [17]). In other words, the algorithm estimates the direction of the gradient ∇ξ, i.e., the
slope but not the magnitude. Notice that Algorithm 2 in [17] considers query arguments lying
only in one orthant of the sphere S since it is assumed a ≥ 0. However, it is easy to extend
the algorithm so that any scale invariant linear metric a can be elicited, i.e., without the
monotonicity condition. This is achieved by asking q additional queries to determine the search
orthant, thus this does not affect the query complexity. We refer to this modified algorithm as
Standard Linear Performance Metric Elicitation (SLPME) (see Appendix A for details) and
summarize the discussion with the following remark.
Remark 1. Given a q-dimensional space Z enclosing a sphere S ⊂ Z, a metric ξ(z) := 〈a, z〉,
and an oracle Ω(·, ·; ξ), the SLPME algorithm (Algorithm 2, Appendix A) provides an estimate aˆ
with ‖aˆ‖2 = 1 such that the estimated slope is close to the true slope, i.e., ai/aj ≈ aˆi/ˆaj ∀ i, j ∈ [q].
Next, we show the existence of a feasible sphere in Rg so that SLPME can be used to elicit
linear rate metrics. We then show how SLPME is used as a subroutine to elicit the fair metric
in Definition 1.
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3 Geometry of the product set R1:m
Let ei ∈ {0, 1}q for i ∈ [k] be the rates achieved by trivial classifiers, i.e., classifiers predicting
only class i on the entire space X . Notice that the rates ei’s are identical for all groups.
Proposition 1 (Geometry of R1:m; Figure 2). For any group g ∈ [m], the set of confusion
rates Rg is convex, bounded in [0, 1]q, and has vertices {ei}ki=1. The intersection of group rate
sets R1 ∩ · · · ∩ Rm is convex and always contains the non-vertex rate o = 1
k
∑k
i=1 ei associated
with the trivial classifier predicting each class with equal probability on the entire space X .
Since R1 ∩ · · · ∩ Rm is convex and always contains a non-vertex point o in the interior, we
may make the following assumption (see Figure 2 for an illustration).
Assumption 1. ∃ a q-dimensional sphere Sρ ⊂ R1 ∩ · · · ∩Rm of radius ρ > 0 centered at o.
Such a sphere always exists as long as the class-conditional distributions are not identical, i.e.,
there is some signal for non-trivial classification conditioned on each group [17]. A method to
obtain Sρ from [17] is discussed in Appendix B.1. We end this section by outlining a trivial
yet useful remark.
Remark 2. Since the sphere Sρ ⊂ R1 ∩ · · · ∩ Rm, any rate s ∈ Sρ is feasible for all groups,
i.e., s is achievable by some classifier conditioned on each group g ∈ [m]. Moreover, if two
groups u, v ∈ [m] achieve the same rate s ∈ Sρ, then the associated discrepancy vector duv = 0.
4 Metric Elicitation
Suppose that the oracle’s fair performance metric is Ψ parametrized by (a,B, λ) as in Def-
inition 1. We now propose an efficient FPME procedure to elicit the oracle’s metric. The
overall FPME framework is presented in Figure 3 and is summarized in Algorithm 1. As shown
in Figure 3, the FPME procedure has three parts which it follows in sequence: (a) eliciting
the misclassification cost φ(r) (i.e., a), (b) eliciting the fairness violation ϕ(r1:m) (i.e., B),
and (c) eliciting the trade-off between the misclassification cost and fairness violation (i.e.,
λ). The framework exploits the sphere Sρ ⊂ R1 ∩ · · · ∩ Rm and uses the SLPME procedure
(Algorithm 2, Appendix A) and another binary-search based Algorithm 4 (Appendix C.3) as
subroutines. We will discuss each step in detail and provide proof of correctness as we progress.
We first discuss FPME with no feedback noise from the oracle and later show robustness to
noisy feedback and query complexity guarantees in Section 5.
4.1 Eliciting the Misclassification Cost φ(r); Part 1 in Figure 3
The response to a query combines the effect of both misclassification cost and fairness violation.
Thus, the key to eliciting the misclassification cost φ is to query rates for which the fairness
violation is zero, so the oracle’s responses are unaffected by the fairness term. Specifically,
consider a parametrization ν : Sρ → R1:m:
ν(s) := (s, s, . . . , s), (8)
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Figure 3: Workflow of the FPME procedure.
Algorithm 1: FPM Elicitation
Input: Query spaces Sρ, S+% , parametrizations ν,
ν ′, ν ′′, search tolerance  > 0, oracle Ω(·, ·; Ψ) with
metric Ψ
1: aˆ← SLPME(Sρ, ,Ω(·, · ; Ψ ◦ ν(·))
2: If m == 2
3: f˘ ←SLPME(Sρ, ,Ω(·, · ; Ψ ◦ ν ′(·, 1))
4: f˜ ←SLPME(Sρ, ,Ω(·, · ; Ψ ◦ ν ′(·, k))
5: bˆ12 ← normalized solution from (12)
6: Else Let L ← ∅
7: For σ ∈M do
8: f˘σ ←SLPME(Sρ, ,Ω(·, · ; Ψ ◦ ν ′(·, σ, 1))
9: f˜σ ←SLPME(Sρ, ,Ω(·, · ; Ψ ◦ ν ′(·, σ, k))
10: Let `σ be Eq. (14), extend L ← L ∪ {`σ}
11: Bˆ← normalized solution from (15) using L
12: λˆ← Algorithm 4 (S+% , ,Ω(·, · ; Ψ ◦ ν ′′(·))
Output: aˆ, Bˆ, λˆ
i.e., ν assigns all group rates to be s ∈ Sρ. For any element ν(s) ∈ R1:m, the associated
discrepancy terms duv = 0 for all u, v ∈ [m] (Remark 2). Thus, for query elements constrained
to lie in the image of ν, the metric in Definition 1 reduces to a linear metric in s, i.e.:
Ψ(ν(s) ; a,B, λ) = (1− λ)〈a, s〉.
Observe that Ω(ν(s1), ν(s2) ; Ψ) ≡ Ω(s1, s2 ; Ψ ◦ ν); hence, when the query space of the original
oracle with metric Ψ is restricted to the image of the parametrization ν, it is equivalent to an
oracle with metric Ψ ◦ ν for the SLPME procedure. Thus line 1 in Algorithm 1 applies the
SLPME subroutine with query space Sρ, binary search tolerance , and the equivalent oracle
Ω(·, · ; Ψ ◦ ν). From Remark 1, this subroutine returns a slope f with ‖f‖2 = 1 such that:
(1− λ)ai
(1− λ)aj
=
fi
fj
=⇒ ai
aj
=
fi
fj
. (9)
Thus, we set aˆ := f (line 1, Algorithm 1). See part 1 in Figure 3 for further illustration. Notice
that this procedure recovers aˆ independent of the trade-off λ and fairness violation ϕ.
4.2 Eliciting the Fairness Violation ϕ(r1:m); Part 2 in Figure 3
For the ease of understanding, we divide this subsection into two parts. We first discuss
eliciting ϕ(r1:m) in the special case of m = 2 groups and then extend the proposed procedure
for m > 2.
4.2.1 Eliciting the Fairness Violation ϕ(r1:m) for m = 2; lines 2-5 in Algorithm 1
Note that the fairness violation in Definition 1 is non-linear in the rates. So for eliciting
the fairness violation weights b12, we selectively query rates containing non-zero discrepancy
between the two groups such that the non-linearity in the metric is controllable in the oracle’s
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responses. In particular, recall from Section 3 that the rates ei ∈ {0, 1}q ∀ i ∈ [k] associated with
trivial classifiers are feasible for all groups g ∈ [m]. Since ei’s are binary vectors, fixing trivial
classifiers for one group and non-trivial for the other reveals the sign of the absolute function
in ϕ. In turn, we are able to linearize the metric. Specifically, consider a parametrization
ν ′ : (Sρ, [k])→ R1:2 defined as:
ν ′(s, i) := (s, ei), (10)
i.e., ν ′ assigns rates s ∈ Sρ to group 1 and trivial rates ei to group 2 (associated with fixing
trivial classifier h2(x) = i ∀x ∈ X ). Since the rates ei are known binary vectors and coordinates
of s are between 0 and 1, the sign of the absolute function in (6) wrt. each coordinate of s
can be recovered. Thus, for elements constrained to lie in the image of ν ′(·, i), the metric in
Definition 1 reduces to:
Ψ(ν ′(s, i) ; a,b
12
, λ) = 〈(1− λ)a (1− τ 2) + λwi  b12, s〉+ ci, (11)
where wi := 1 − 2ei and ci is a constant not affecting the responses. This is again a linear
metric in s. Similar to Section 4.1, notice that Ω(ν ′(s1, i), ν ′(s2, i) ; Ψ) ≡ Ω(s1, s2 ; Ψ ◦ ν ′(·, i)).
Hence, when the query space of the original oracle with metric Ψ is restricted to lie in the
image of ν ′(·, i), it is equivalent to an oracle with metric Ψ◦ ν ′(·, i). Thus we may again employ
the SLPME subroutine with the query space Sρ, binary search tolerance , and the equivalent
oracle Ω(·, · ; Ψ ◦ ν ′(·, i)).
However, unlike Section 4.1, we must run the SLPME procedure twice to get q independent
equations to elicit the q dimensional vector b12. This is achieved by running SLPME after
fixing h2(x) = 1 (line 3, Algorithm 1) and then again running SLPME after fixing h2(x) = k
(line 4, Algorithm 1) for group 2. This results in two slopes f˘ , f˜ such that ‖f˘‖2 = ‖f˜‖2 = 1
from which it is easy to obtain the fairness violation weights:
bˆ12 =
b˜12
‖b˜12‖2
, where b˜12 = w1 
[
δf˘ − aˆ (1− τ 2)
]
, (12)
where δ is a scalar depending on the known entities τ 12, aˆ, f˘12, f˜12. The derivation is provided
in Appendix C.2.1. Notice that, due to the scale invariance in ϕ (Definition 1), the normalized
solution bˆ12 is independent of the true trade-off λ but depends on the elicited vector aˆ from
Section 4.1.
4.2.2 Eliciting the Fairness Violation ϕ(r1:m) for m > 2; line 6-11 in Algorithm 1
We briefly outline the elicitation procedure for m > 2 groups, with details in Appendix C.2.2.
LetM⊂ 2[m] \ {∅, [m]} be a non-empty set of sets of groups defined by m. As in the m = 2
case, we assign trivial rates to one set of groups σ ∈ M and rates s ∈ Sρ to the remaining
groups in [m] \ σ. We then follow a similar process by first defining a parametrization
ν ′ : (Sρ,M, [k])→ R1:m as:
ν ′(s, σ, i) := r1:m such that rg =
{
ei if g ∈ σ
s o.w.
(13)
and then using the SLPME subroutine with the equivalent oracles Ω(·, · ; Ψ ◦ ν ′(·, σ, 1)) and
Ω(·, · ; Ψ ◦ ν ′(·, σ, k)) in line 8 and line 9 of Algorithm 1, respectively. See part 2 in Figure 3
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for illustration. Thus, for a partitioning of groups defined by σ ∈ M, we get the following
generalized version of (12):∑
u,v
1
[|{u, v} ∩ σ| = 1] b˜uv = w1  [δσ f˘σ − aˆ (1− τ σ)] , (14)
where τ σ =
∑
g∈σ τ
g and b˜uv := λbuv/(1−λ) is a scaled version of the true (unknown) b, which
nonetheless can be computed from (14). Since we want to elicit M fairness violation weight
vectors, we require M ways of partitioning the groups into two sets so that we construct M
independent equations similar to (14). LetM be those set of sets. M provides the required
system of equations L in line 10 of Algorithm 1. From the solution of system of equations L
(equation (35), Appendix C.2.2), we recover {b˜uv}mu,v=1,v>u, which when normalized returns
the final fairness violation weights
bˆuv =
b˜uv∑m
u,v=1,v>u ‖b˜uv‖2
for u, v ∈ [m], v > u. (15)
Due to the normalization, the elicited fairness violation weights are independent of the trade-off
λ.
4.3 Eliciting Trade-off λ; Part 3 in Figure 3
The final step is to elicit the trade-off λ between the misclassification cost φ and fairness
violation ϕ, given aˆ and Bˆ. Here, the key insight is to completely remove the non-linearity
posed by the absolute function in Definition 1, which then reduces the problem to a one-
dimensional binary search. To this end, we generate queries from a q-dimensional sphere
S+% ⊂ Sρ where % < ρ, as shown in Figure 2. Clearly, s+ ≥ o, ∀ s+ ∈ S+% . Specifically, we
construct a parametrization ν ′′ : S+% → R1:m:
ν ′′(s+) := (s+,o, . . . ,o), (16)
where ν ′′ assigns s+ ∈ S+% to the first group and assigns trivial rates o to the rest of the
groups. For any element ν ′′(s+) ∈ R1:m, the associated discrepancy terms duv = 0 for u, v 6= 1
(Remark 2). For the remaining discrepancy terms, the sign of the absolute function in (6) is
known since s+ ≥ o. Thus for elements in the image of ν ′′, the metric in Definition 1 reduces
to a linear metric in s+, i.e:
Ψ(ν ′′(s+) ; a,B, λ) = 〈(1− λ)τ 1  a+ λ
∑m
v=2
b
1v
, s+〉+ c, (17)
where the constant c does not affect the oracle responses. The following lemma shows that the
metric in (17) is quasiconcave in trade-off λ and is the basis of the proposed subroutine to
elicit λ.
Lemma 1. Under the regularity assumption that 〈a,∑mv=2 b1v〉 6= 1, the function
ϑ(λ) := maxs+∈S+% Ψ(ν
′′(s+) ; a,B, λ) (18)
is strictly quasiconcave (and therefore unimodal) in λ.
The unimodality of ϑ(λ) allows us to perform the one-dimensional binary search in Algorithm 4
(Appendix C.3) using the query space S+% , tolerance , and the equivalent oracle Ω(· ; Ψ ◦ ν ′′(·)).
See Part 3 in Figure 3 for illustration. Algorithm 1 calls Algorithm 4 as a subroutine in line 12
to recover λˆ. Combining part 1, part 2, and part 3 of the workflow in Figure 3 completes the
FPME procedure.
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5 Guarantees
We discuss elicitation guarantees under the following feedback model, which is useful in practice.
Definition 4 (Oracle Feedback Noise: Ω ≥ 0). For two rates r1:m1 , r1:m2 ∈ R1:m, the oracle
responds correctly as long as |Ψ(r1:m1 )−Ψ(r1:m2 )| > Ω. Otherwise, it may be incorrect.
In words, the oracle may respond incorrectly if the rates are very close as measured by the
metric Ψ. Since deriving the final metric involves offline computations including certain ratios,
we discuss guarantees under a regularity assumption that ensures all components are well
defined.
Assumption 2. We assume that 1 > c1 > λ > c2 > 0, ‖a‖∞ > c3, ‖(1− λ)a τ σ − λwi 
b
σ‖∞ > c4 ∀ i ∈ [q], σ ∈M, for some c1, c2, c3, c4 > 0, ρ > % Ω, and 〈a,
∑m
v=2 b
1v〉 6= 1.
Theorem 1. Given , Ω ≥ 0, and a 1-Lipschitz fair performance metric Ψ parametrized by
a,B, λ, under Assumption 2, Algorithm 1 returns a metric Ψˆ with parameters:
• aˆ : after O
(
q log pi
2
)
queries such that ‖a− aˆ‖2 ≤ O
(√
q(+
√
Ω/ρ)
)
.
• Bˆ : after O
(
Mq log pi
2
)
queries such that ‖vec(B)− vec(Bˆ)‖2 ≤ O
(
mq(+
√
Ω/ρ)
)
, where
vec(·) vectorizes the matrix.
• λˆ : after O(log(1

)) queries, with error |λ− λˆ| ≤ O
(
+
√
Ω/%+
√
mq(+
√
Ω/ρ)/%
)
.
We see that the proposed FPME procedure is robust to noise, and its query complexity depends
linearly in the number of unknown entities. For instance, line 1 in Algorithm 1 elicits aˆ ∈ Rq
by posing O˜(q) queries, the ‘for’ loop in line 7 of Algorithm 1 runs for M iterations, where each
iteration requires O˜(2q) queries, and finally line 12 in Algorithm 1 is a simple binary search
requiring O˜(1) queries. Previous work suggests that standard linear multiclass elicitation
(SLPME) elicits misclassification costs (φ) with linear query complexity [17]. Surprisingly, our
proposed FPME procedure elicits a more complex (nonlinear) metric without increasing the
query complexity order. Furthermore, since sample estimates of rates are consistent estimators,
and the metrics discussed are 1-Lipschitz wrt. rates, with high probability, we gather correct
oracle feedback from querying with finite sample estimates Ω(rˆ1:m1 , rˆ1
:m
2 ; Ψ) instead of querying
with population statistics Ω(r1:m1 , r1
:m
2 ; Ψ), as long as we have sufficient samples. Apart from
this, Algorithm 1 is agnostic to finite sample errors as long as the sphere Sρ is contained within
the feasible region R1 ∩ · · · ∩ Rm.
6 Experiments
We first empirically validate the FPME procedure and recovery guarantees in Section 6.1 and
then highlight the utility of FPME in evaluating real-world classifiers in Section 6.2 .
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Figure 4: Elicitation error in recovering the oracle’s metric.
6.1 Recovering the Oracle’s Fair Performance Metric
Recall that a sphere Sρ ⊂ R1 ∩ · · · ∩ Rm as long as there is a non-trivial classification signal
within each group (Assumption 1). Thus for experiments, we assume access to a feasible
sphere Sρ with ρ = 0.2. We randomly generate 100 oracle metrics each for k,m ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}
parametrized by {a,B, λ}. This specifies the query outputs by the oracle for each metric in
Algorithm 1. We then use Algorithm 1 with tolerance  = 10−3 to elicit corresponding metrics
parametrized by {aˆ, Bˆ, λˆ}. Algorithm 1 makes 1 + 2M subroutine calls to SLPME procedure
and 1 call to Algorithm 4. SLPME subroutine requires exactly 16(q − 1) log(pi/2) queries,
where we use 4 queries to shrink the interval in the binary search loop and fix 4 cycles for the
coordinate-wise search. Also, Algorithm 4 requires 4 log(1/) queries.
In Figure 4, we report the mean of the `2-norm between the oracle’s metric and the elicited
metric. Clearly, we elicit metrics that are very close to the true metrics. Moreover, this
holds true across a range of m and k values indicating robustness of the proposed approach.
Figure 4(a) shows that the error ‖a− aˆ‖2 increases only with the number of classes k and not
groups m. This is expected since aˆ is elicited by querying rates that nullify fairness violation
(Section 4.1). Figure 5(a) verifies Theorem 1 by showing that ‖vec(B)− vec(Bˆ)‖2 increases
with both number of classes k and groups m. In accord with Theorem 1, Figure 5(b) shows
that the elicited trade-off λˆ is also close to the true λ. However, the elicitation error increases
consistently with groups m but not with classes k. A possible reason may be the cancellation
of errors from eliciting aˆ and Bˆ separately.
6.2 Ranking of Classifiers for Real-world Datasets
One of the most important applications of performance metrics is evaluating classifiers, i.e.,
providing a quantitative score for their quality which then allows us to choose the best (or
best set of) classifier(s). In this section, we discuss how the ranking of plausible classifiers is
affected when a practitioner employs default metrics to rank (fair) classifiers instead of the
oracle’s metric or our elicited approximation.
We take four real-world classification datasets with k,m ∈ {2, 3} (see Table 1). 60% of each
dataset is used for training and the rest for testing. We create a pool of 100 classifiers for
each dataset by tweaking hyperparameters under logistic regression models [23], multi-layer
perceptron models [34], support vector machines [19], LightGBM models [22], and fairness
constrained optimization based models [30]. We compute the group wise confusion rates on
the test data for each model for each dataset. We will compare the ranking of these classifiers
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Table 1: Dataset statistics; the real-valued regressor in wine and crime datasets is binned to
three classes.
Dataset k m #samples #features group.feat
default 2 2 30000 33 gender
adult 2 3 43156 74 race
wine 3 2 6497 13 color
crime 3 3 1907 99 race
Table 2: Common (baseline) metrics usually deployed to rank classifiers.
Name → φˆϕˆλˆ_a φˆϕˆλˆ_w φˆϕˆ_a φˆϕˆ_w φˆ_a φˆ_w o_p o_f
aˆ acc. w-acc. acc. w-acc. acc. w-acc. a -
Bˆ acc. w-acc. acc. w-acc. elicit elicit - B
λˆ 0.5 w-acc. elicit elicit elicit elicit 0 1
achieved by competing baseline metrics with respect to the ground truth ranking.
We generate 100 random oracle metrics Ψ. Ψ’s gives us the ground truth ranking of the above
classifiers. We then use our proposed procedure FPME (Algorithm 1) to recover the oracle’s
metric. For comparison in ranking of real-world classifiers, we choose a few metrics that are
routinely employed by practitioners as baselines (see Table 2). The prefixes (i.e. φˆ, ϕˆ, or
λˆ) in name of the baseline metrics denote the components that are set to default metrics,
and the suffixes (i.e. ‘a’ or ‘wa’) denote whether the assignment is done with accuracy (i.e.
equal weights) or with weighted accuracy (weights are assigned randomly however maintaining
the true order of weights as in Ψ). For example, φˆϕˆλˆ_a corresponds to the metric where
φˆ, ϕˆ, λˆ are set to standard classification accuracy. Similarly, φˆ_w denote a metric where the
misclassification cost φˆ is set to weighted accuracy but both ϕˆ and λˆ are elicited using Part 2
and Part 3 of the FPME procedure (Algorithm 1), respectively. Assigning weighted accuracy
versions is a commonplace since sometimes the order of the costs associated with the types of
mistakes in misclassification cost φ or fairness violation ϕ or preference for fairness violation
over misclassification λ is known but not the actual cost. Another example is φˆϕˆ_a which
corresponds to the metric where φˆ, ϕˆ are set to accuracy and only the trade-off λˆ is elicited
using Part 3 of the FPME procedure (Algorithm 1). This is similar to prior work by Zhang et
al. [45] who assumed the classification error and fairness violation known, so only the trade-off
has to be elicited – however they also assume direct ratio queries, which can be challenging in
practice. Our approach applies much simnpler pairwise preference queries. Lastly, o_p and o_f
represent only predictive performance with λ = 0 and only fairness with λ = 1, respectively.
Figure 5 shows average NDCG (with exponential gain) [40] and Kendall-tau coefficient [37]
over 100 metrics Ψ and their respective estimates by the competing baseline metrics. We see
that FPME, wherein we elicit φˆ, ϕˆ, and λˆ in sequence, achieves the highest possible NDCG and
Kendall-tau coefficient. Even though we make some elicitation error in recovery (Section 8), we
achieve almost perfect results while ranking the classifiers. To connect to practice, this implies
that when given a set of classifiers, ranking based on elicited metrics will align most closely to
ranking based on the true metric, as compared to ranking classifiers based on default metrics.
This is a crucial advantage of metric elicitation for practical purposes. In this experiment,
baseline metrics achieve inferior ranking of classifiers in comparison to the rankings achieved
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Figure 5: Ranking Performance of competing metrics while ranking real-world classifiers.
by metrics that are elicited using the proposed FPME procedure. Figure 5 also suggests that
it is beneficial to elicit all three components (a,B, λ) of the metric in Definition 1, rather
than pre-define a component and elicit the rest. For the crime dataset, some methods also
achieve high NDCG values, so ranking at the top is good; however Kendall-tau coefficient is
weak which suggests that overall ranking is poor. With the exception of the default dataset,
the weighted versions are better than equally weighted versions in ranking. This is expected
because in weighted versions, at least order of the preference for the type of costs matches
with the oracle’s preferences.
7 Related Work
Some early attempts to eliciting individual fairness metrics [18, 28] are distinct from ours –
as we are focused on the more prevalent setting of group fairness, yet for which there are no
existing approaches to our knowledge. Zhang et al. [45] propose an approach that elicits only
the trade-off between accuracy and fairness using complicated ratio queries. We, on the other
hand, elicit classification cost, fairness violation, and the trade-off together as a non-linear
function, all using much simpler pairwise comparison queries. Prior work for constrained
classification focus on learning classifiers under constraints for fairness [13, 14, 44, 29]. We take
the regularization view of algorithmic fairness, where a fairness violation is embedded in the
metric definition instead of as constraints [21, 6, 9, 2, 27]. From the elicitation perspective, the
closest line of work to ours is Hiranandani et al. [16, 17], who propose the problem of ME but
solve it only for a simpler setting of classification without fairness. As we move to multiclass,
multigroup fair performance ME, we find that the complexity of both the form of the metrics
and the query space increases. This results in starkly different elicitation strategy with novel
methods required to provide query complexity guarantees. Learning (linear) functions passively
using pairwise comparisons is a mature field [20, 15, 35], but these approaches fail to control
sample (i.e. query) complexity. Active learning in fairness [32] is a related direction; however
the aim there is to learn a fair classifier based on fixed metric instead of eliciting the metric
itself.
8 Discussion Points and Future Work
• Transportability: Our elicitation procedure is independent of the population P as long as
there exists a sphere of rates which is feasible for all groups. Thus, any metric that is learned
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using one dataset or model class (i.e. by estimated Pˆ) can be applied to other applications
and datasets, as long as the expert believes the context and tradeoffs are the same.
• Extensions. The FPME procedure can be modified to leverage the structure in the metric
or groups to decrease the query complexity, e.g., when the fairness violation weights are the
same for all pairs of groups, the procedure in Section C.2.2 requires only one partitioning of
groups to elicit the metric ϕˆ. Such modifications are easy to incorporate. In the future, we
plan to extend our approach to more complex metrics such as linear-fractional functions of
predictive rates and discrepancies.
• Practicality. Like standard ME tasks [16, 17], FPME can be applied by posing classifier
comparisons directly via A/B testing [39] or via interpretable learning techniques [36, 10].
We also aim to build novel visualizations similar to [45] for comparing classifiers or rates for
real user studies.
• Optimal bounds. We conjecture that our query complexity bounds are tight; however, we
leave this detail for the future. In conclusion, we elicit a more complex (non-linear) group
fair-metric with the same query complexity order as standard classification linear elicitation
procedures [17].
9 Conclusion
We study the space of multiclass, multigroup predicitve rates and propose a novel, provably
query efficient strategy to elicit group-fair performance metrics. The proposed procedure only
requires pairwise preference feedback over classifiers and and is robust to finite sample and
feedback noise.
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Appendices
A Standard Linear Performance Metric Elicitation
As explained in Section 2.3, we use the linear metric elicitation procedure [17] as a subroutine
in order to elicit a more complicated metric as defined in Definition 1. For completeness, we
provide the details here.
The linear metric elicitation procedure proposed in [17] assumes an enclosed sphere S ⊂ Z,
where Z is the q-dimensional space of classifier statistics that are feasible, i.e., can be achieved
by some classifier. Let the the radius of the sphere S be ρ. We extend the linear metric
elicitation procedure (Algorithm 2 in [17]) to elicit any linear metric (without the monotonicity
condition) defined over the space Z. This is because in Section 4.2, we require to elicit slopes
that are not necessarily for monotonic metrics (e.g., see Equation (11)). Let the oracle’s scale
invariant metric be ξ(z) := 〈a, z〉, such that ‖a‖2 = 1. Analogously, the oracle queries are
Ω (z1, z2 ; ξ) := 1[ξ(z1) > ξ(z2)]. We start by outlining a trivial Lemma from [17].
Lemma 2. [17] Let ξ be a linear metric parametrized by a such that ‖a‖2 = 1, then the
unique optimal classifier statistic z over the sphere S is a point on the boundary of S given by
z = ρa+ o, where o is the center of the sphere S.
Given a linear performance metric, Lemma 2 provides a unique point in the query space which
lies on the boundary of the sphere ∂S. Moreover, the converse also holds true that given a
point on the boundary of the sphere ∂S, one may recover the linear metric for which the given
point is optimal. Thus, in order to elicit a linear metric, Hiranandani et al. [17] essentially
search for the optimal statistic (over the surface of the sphere) using pairwise queries to the
oracle which in turn reveals the true metric. The algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 2. The
algorithm also uses the following standard paramterization for the surface of the sphere ∂S.
Parameterizing the boundary of the enclosed sphere ∂S. Let θ be a (q−1)-dimensional
vector of angles, where all the angles except the primary angle are in [0, pi], and the primary
angle is in [0, 2pi]. A linear performance metric with ‖a‖2 = 1 is constructed by setting
ai = Π
i−1
j=1 sin θj cos θi for i ∈ [q − 1] and aq = Πq−1j=1 sin θj. By using Lemma 2, the metric’s
optimal classifier statistic over the sphere S is easy to compute. Thus, varying θ in this
procedure, parametrizes the surface of the sphere ∂S. We denote this parametrization by µ(θ),
where µ : [0, pi]q−2 × [0, 2pi]→ ∂S.
Description of Algorithm 2:1 Suppose that the oracle’s linear metric is ξ parametrized by a
where ‖a‖2 = 1 (Section 2.3). Using the parametrization µ(θ) of the surface of the sphere ∂S
as explained above, Algorithm 2 returns an estimate aˆ with ‖aˆ‖2 = 1. Line 2-6 in Algorithm 2
recovers the orthant of the optimal statistic over the sphere by posing q trivial queries. Once
the search orthant of the optimal statistic is fixed, the procedure is same as Algorithm 2
of [17]. In each iteration of the for loop, the algorithm updates one angle θj keeping other
angles fixed by a binary-search procedure, where the ShrinkInterval subroutine (illustrated
in Figure 6) shrinks the interval [θaj , θbj ] by half based on the responses. Then the algorithm
1The superscripts in Algorithm 2 denote iterates. Please do not confuse it with the sensitive group index.
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Algorithm 2 Standard Linear Performance Metric Elicitation
1: Input: Query space S, binary-search tolerance  > 0, oracle Ω(·, · ; ξ) with metric ξ
2: for i = 1, 2, · · · q do
3: Set a = a′ = (1/√q, . . . , 1/√q).
4: Set a′i = −1/
√
q.
5: Compute the optimal z(a) and z(a′) over the sphere S using Lemma 2
6: Query Ω(z(a), z(a′); ξ)
{Fix the search orthant based on the above oracle responses}
7: Initialize: θ = θ(1) {θ(1) is any point in the search orthant.}
8: for t = 1, 2, · · · , T = 4(q − 1) do
9: Set θ(a) = θ(c) = θ(d) = θ(e) = θ(b) = θ(t).
10: while
∣∣∣θ(b)j − θ(a)j ∣∣∣ >  do
11: Set θ(c)j =
3θ
(a)
j +θ
(b)
j
4 , θ
(d)
j =
θ
(a)
j +θ
(b)
j
2 , and θ
(e)
j =
θ
(a)
j +3θ
(b)
j
4 .
12: Set z(a) = µ(θ(a)) (i.e. parametrization of ∂S). Similarly, set z(c), z(d), z(e), z(b)
13: Query Ω(z(c), z(a) ; ξ),Ω(z(d), z(c) ; ξ), Ω(z(e), z(d) ; ξ),Ω(z(b), z(e) ; ξ).
14: [θ(a)j , θ
(b)
j ]← ShrinkInterval (responses) {see Figure 6}
15: Set θ(d)j =
1
2(θ
(a)
j + θ
(b)
j )
16: Set θ(t) = θ(d).
17: Output: aˆi = Πi−1j=1 sin θ
(T )
j cos θi
(T ) ∀i ∈ [q − 1], aˆq = Πq−1j=1 sin θ(T )j
cyclically updates each angle until it converges to a metric sufficiently close to the true metric.
The number of cycles in coordinate-wise search is fixed to four.
B Proofs and Details of Section 3
Proof of Proposition 1. The set of rates Rg for a group g satisfies the following properties:
• Convex : Let us take two classifiers hg1, h
g
2 ∈ Hg which achieve the rates rg1, rg2 ∈ Rg. We
need to check whether or not the convex combination αrg1 + (1− α)rg2 is feasible, i.e., there
exists some classifier which achieve this rate. Consider a classifier hg, which with probability
α predicts what classifier hg1 predicts and with probability 1− α predicts what classifier hg2
predicts. Then the elements of the rate matrix Rgij(h) is given by:
Rgij(h) = P(hg = j|Y = i)
= P(hg1 = j|hg = hg1, Y = i)P(hg = hg1) + P(hg2 = j|hg = hg2, Y = i)P(hg = hg2)
= αrg1 + (1− α)rg2.
Therefore, Rg ∀ g ∈ [m] is convex.
• Bounded: Since Rgij(h) = P [h = j|Y = i] = P [h = j, Y = i]/P [Y = i] ≤ 1 for all i, j ∈ [k],
Rg ⊆ [0, 1]q.
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Subroutine ShrinkInterval
Input: Oracle responses for Ω(z(c), z(a) ; ξ),
Ω(z(d), z(c) ; ξ), Ω(z(e), z(d) ; ξ),Ω(z(b), z(e) ; ξ)
If (z(a)  z(c)) Set θ(b)j = θ(d)j .
elseif (z(a) ≺ z(c)  z(d)) Set θ(b)j = θ(d)j .
elseif (z(c) ≺ z(d)  z(e)) Set θ(a)j = θ(c)j , θ(b)j = θ(e)j .
elseif (z(d) ≺ z(e)  z(b)) Set θ(a)j = θ(d)j .
else Set θ(a)j = θ
(d)
j .
Output: [θ(a)j , θ
(b)
j ].
ξ
θjθ
(a)
j θ
(c)
j θ
(d)
j θ
(e)
j θ
(b)
j
Figure 6: (Left): Subroutine ShrinkInterval. (Right): Visual intuition of the subroutine
ShrinkInterval [17]; the subroutine shrinks the current interval to half based on oracle responses
to the four queries.
• ei’s and o are always achieved: The classifier which always predicts class i, will achieve the
rate ei. Thus, ei ∈ Rg ∀ i ∈ [k], g ∈ [m] are feasible. Just like the convexity proof, a classifier
which predicts similar to one of the trivial classifiers with probability 1/k achieves rate o.
• ei’s are vertices: Any supporting hyperplane with slope `1i < `1j < 0 and `1p = 0 for
p ∈ [k], p 6= i, j will be supported by e1 (corresponding to the trivial classifier which predict
class 1). Thus, ei’s are vertices of the convex set. As long as the class-conditional distributions
are not identical, i.e., there is some signal for non-trivial classification conditioned on each
group [17], one can construct a ball around the trivial rate o and thus o lies in the interior.
B.1 Finding the Sphere Sρ
In this section, we discuss how a sufficiently large sphere Sρ with radius ρ may be found. The
following discussion is extended from [17] to multiple groups setting and provided here for
completeness.
The following optimization problem is a special case of OP2 in [29]. The problem corresponds
to feasiblity check problem for a given rate r0 achieved by all groups within small error  > 0.
min
rg∈Rg ∀g∈[m]
0 s.t. ‖rg − r0‖2 ≤  ∀ g ∈ [m]. (OP1)
The above problem checks the feasibility and if a solution to the above problem exists, then
Algorithm 1 of [29] returns it. The approach in [29] constructs a classifier whose group-wise
rates are -close to the given rate r0.
Furthermore, Algorithm 3 computes a value of ρ ≥ s˜/k, where s˜ is the radius of the largest
ball contained in the set R1 ∩ · · · ∩Rm. Notice that the approach in [29] is consistent, thus we
should get a good estimate of the sphere, provided we have sufficient samples. The algorithm
runs offline and does not impact query complexity.
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Algorithm 3 Obtaining the sphere Sρ with radius ρ
1: Input: The center o of the feasible region of rates across groups.
2: for j = 1, 2, · · · , q do
3: Let rj be the standard basis vector for the j-th dimension.
4: Compute the maximum `j such that o+ `jrj is feasible for all groups by solving (OP1).
5: Let CONV be the convex hull of {o± `jrj}qj=1.
6: Compute the radius s of the largest ball which can fit inside of CONV , centered at o.
7: Output: Sphere Sρ with radius ρ = s centered at o.
Lemma 3. [17] Let s˜ be the radius of the largest ball centered at o in R1 ∩ · · · ∩ Rm. Then
Algorithm 3 returns a radius ρ ≥ s˜/k.
Proof. Let `j be as computed in the algorithm and ` := minj `j , then we have ` ≥ s˜. Moreover,
the region CONV contains the convex hull of {o± `ej}qj=1; however, this region contains a
ball of radius `/√q = `/√k2 − k ≥ `/k ≥ s˜/k, and thus ρ ≥ s˜/k.
C Derivations of Section 4
C.1 Eliciting the Misclassification Cost φ(r); Part 1 in Figure 3
The key to eliciting φ is to remove the effect of fairness violation ϕ in the oracle responses. As
explained in Section 4.1, we run the SLPME procedure (Algorithm 2) with the q-dimensional
query space Sρ, binary search tolerance , the equivalent oracle with metric Ψ ◦ ν. From
Remark 1, this subroutine returns a slope f with ‖f‖2 = 1 such that:
(1− λ)ai
(1− λ)aj
=
fi
fj
=⇒ ai
aj
=
fi
fj
. (19)
Thus, we set aˆ := f (line 1, Algorithm 1).
C.2 Eliciting the Fairness Violation ϕ(r1:m); Part 2 in Figure 3
C.2.1 Eliciting the Fairness Violation ϕ(r1:m) for m = 2; lines 2-5 in Algorithm 1
For m = 2, we have only one vector of unfairness weights b12, which we now aim to elicit given
aˆ. As discussed in Section 4.2.1, we fix trivial rates (through trivial classifiers) to one group
and allow non-trivial rates from Sρ on another group. This essentially makes the metric in
Definition 1 linear. The elicitation procedure is as follows.
Fix trivial classifier predicting class 1 for group 2 i.e. fix h2(x) = 1 ∀x ∈ X , and thus r2 = e1.
For group 1, we constrain the confusion rates to lie in the sphere Sρ i.e. r1 = s for s ∈ Sρ.
Such a set up is governed by the parametrization ν ′(·, 1) in equation (10), and the metric in
Definition 1 amounts to:
Ψ(ν ′(s, 1); a,b
12
, λ) = (1− λ)〈a (1− τ 2), s〉+ λ〈b12, |e1 − s|〉+ c1. (20)
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The above is a function of s ∈ Sρ. Since ei’s are binary vectors and since 0 ≤ s ≤ 1, the sign of
the absolute function with respect to s can be recovered. Recall that the rates are defined in
row major form of the rate matrices, thus e1 is 1 at every (k+ j ∗ (k− 1))-th coordinate, where
j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 2}, and 0 otherwise. The coordinates where the confusion rates are 1 in e1,
the absolute function opens with a negative sign (wrt. s) and with a positive sign otherwise.
In particular, define a q-dimensional vector w1 with entries −1 at every (k + j ∗ (k − 1))-th
coordinate, where j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 2}, and 1 otherwise. One may then write the metric Ψ as:
Ψ(ν ′(s, 1) ; a,b
12
, λ) = 〈(1− λ)a (1− τ 2) + λw1  b12, s〉+ c1. (21)
This is again a linear metric elicitation problem where s ∈ S. We may again use the SLPME
procedure (Algorithm 2), which outputs a (normalized) slope f˘ with ‖f˘‖2 = 1 in line 3 of
Algorithm 1. Using Remark 1, we get q − 1 independent equations and may represent every
element of b12 based on one element, say b12k−1, i.e.:
f˘k−1
f˘i
=
(1− λ)(1− τ 2k−1)ak−1 + λb
12
k−1
(1− λ)(1− τ 2i )ai + λw1ib
12
i
∀ i ∈ [q].
=⇒ λb12 = w1 

(1− λ)(1− τ 2k−1)ak−1 + λb12k−1
f˘k−1
 f˘ − (1− λ)((1− τ 2) a)
 . (22)
In order to elicit entire b12, we need one more linear relation such as (22). So, we now fix the
trivial classifier predicting class k for group 2 i.e. fix h2(x) = k ∀x ∈ X , and thus r2 = ek.
For group 1, we constrain the rates to again lie in the sphere Sρ i.e. r1 = s for s ∈ Sρ. Such
a setup is governed by the parametrization ν ′(·, k) (10). Since the rate vectors are in row
major form of the rate matrices, notice that ek is 1 at every (k− 1 + j ∗ (k− 1))-th coordinate,
where j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 2}, and 0 otherwise. In particular, define a q-dimensional vector wk
with entries −1 at every (k − 1 + j ∗ (k − 1))-th coordinate, where j ∈ {0, . . . , k − 2}, and 1
otherwise. One may then write the metric Ψ as:
Ψ(ν ′(s, k); a,b
12
, λ) = (1− λ)〈a (1− τ 2), s〉+ λ〈b12, |ek − s|〉+ ck. (23)
This is a linear metric elicitation problem where s ∈ S. Thus, line 4 of Algorithm 1 applies
SLPME subroutine (Algorithm 2), which outputs a (normalized) slope f˜ with ‖f˜‖2 = 1. Using
Remark 1, we extract the following relation between two of its coordinates, say the (k − 1)-th
and ((k − 1)2 + 1)-th coordinates:
f˜k−1
f˜(k−1)2+1
=
(1− λ)(1− τ 2k−1)ak−1 − λb
12
k−1
(1− λ)(1− τ 2(k−1)2+1)a(k−1)2+1 + λb
12
(k−1)2+1
. (24)
Combining equations (22) and (24) and replacing the true a with the estimated aˆ from
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Section 4.1, we have an estimate of the scaled substitute as:
b˜12 = w1 
[
δf˘12 − aˆ (1− τ 2)
]
, (25)
where δ =
2(1− τ 2k−1)aˆk−1
f˘k−1

(1−τ2
(k−1)2+1)aˆ(k−1)2+1
(1−τ2k−1)aˆk−1
− f˜(k−1)2+1
f˜k−1(
f˘(k−1)2+1
f˘k−1
− f˜(k−1)2+1
f˜k−1
)

and b˜ is a scaled substitute defined as b˜12 := λ
(1−λ)b
12, which nonetheless is computable
from (25). Since we require a solution bˆ such that ‖bˆ‖2 = 1 (Definition 1), we normalize b˜
and get the final solution:
bˆ12 =
b˜12
‖b˜12‖2
. (26)
Notice that, due to the above normalization, the solution is independent of the true trade-off λ.
C.2.2 Eliciting the Fairness Violation ϕ(r1:m) for m > 2; line 6-11 in Algorithm 1
Consider a non-empty set of setsM ⊂ 2[m] \ {∅, [m]}. We will later discuss how to choose
M for efficient elicitation. When m > 2, we partition the set of groups [m] into two sets of
groups. Let σ ∈ M and [m] \ σ be one such partition of the m groups defined by the set σ.
We follow exactly similar procedure as in the previous section i.e. fixing trivial rates (through
trivial classifiers) on the groups in σ and allowing non-trivial rates from Sρ on the groups in
[m] \ σ. In particular, consider a paramterization ν ′ : (Sρ,M, [k])→ R1:m defined as:
ν ′(s, σ, i) := r1:m such that rg =
{
ei if g ∈ σ
s o.w.
(27)
i.e., ν ′ assigns trivial confusion rates ei on the groups in σ and assigns s ∈ Sρ on the rest
of the groups. Similar to the previous section, we first fix trivial classifier predicting class 1
for groups in σ and constrain the rates for groups in [m] \ σ to be on the sphere Sρ. Such
a setup is governed by the parametrization ν ′(·, σ, 1) in equation (13). Specifically, fixing
hg(x) = 1 ∀ g ∈ σ would entail the metric in Definition 1 to be:
Ψ(ν ′(s, σ, 1); a,B, λ) = (1− λ)〈a (1− τ σ), s〉+ λ〈ησ, |e1 − s|〉+ c1, (28)
where τ σ =
∑
g∈σ τ
g and ησ =
∑
u,v∈[m],v>u 1
[|{u, v} ∩ σ| = 1]buv. Similar to the previous
section, since ei’s are binary vectors, the sign of the absolute function wrt. s can be recovered.
In particular, the metric amounts to:
Ψ(ν ′(s, σ, 1); a,B, λ) = 〈(1− λ)a (1− τ 2) + λw1  ησ, s〉+ c1, (29)
where w1 := 1− 2e1 and c1 is a constant not affecting the responses. Notice that (28) and (29)
are analogous to (20) and (21), respectively, except that τ 2 is replaced by τ σ and b12 is
replaced by ησ. This is a linear metric in s. We again the use the SLPME procedure in line 8
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of Algorithm 1, which outputs a normalized slope f˘σ such that ‖f˘σ‖2 = 1, and thus we get an
analogous solution to (22) as:
λησ = w1 
((1− λ)(1− τσk−1)ak−1 + λησk−1
f˘σk−1
)
f˘σ − (1− λ)((1− τ σ) a
 . (30)
In order to elicit entire ησ, we need one more linear relation such as (30). So, we now
fix the trivial rates through trivial classifier predicting class k for the groups in σ i.e. fix
hg(x) = k ∀x ∈ X if g ∈ σ, and thus rg = ek for all groups g ∈ σ. For the rest of the groups,
we constrain the confusion rates to again lie in the sphere Sρ i.e. rg = s for s ∈ Sρ for all
groups g ∈ [m]\σ. Such a setup is governed by the parametrization ν ′(·, σ, k) (13). The metric
Ψ in Definition 1 amounts to:
Ψ(ν ′(s, σ, k); a,B, λ) = (1− λ)〈a (1− τ σ), s〉+ λ〈ησ, |ek − s|〉+ ck. (31)
Thus by running SLPME procedure again in line 9 of Algorithm 1 results in f˜12 with ‖f˜12‖2 = 1.
Using Remark 1, we extract the following relation between the (k− 1)-th and ((k− 1)2 + 1)-th
coordinates:
f˜σk−1
f˜σ(k−1)2+1
=
(1− λ)(1− τσk−1)ak−1 − λησk−1
(1− λ)(1− τσ(k−1)2+1)a(k−1)2+1 + λησ(k−1)2+1
. (32)
Combining equations (30) and (32), we have:∑
u,v
1
[|{u, v} ∩ σ| = 1] b˜uv = γσ, where (33)
γσ = w1 
[
δσfσ − aˆ (1− τ σ)] , δσ = 2(1− τσk−1)aˆk−1
fσk−1

(1−τσ
(k−1)2+1)aˆ(k−1)2+1
(1−τσk−1)aˆk−1
− f˜
σ
(k−1)2+1
f˜σk−1(
fσ
(k−1)2+1
fσk−1
− f˜
σ
(k−1)2+1
f˜σk−1
)
 ,
and b˜uv := λbuv/(1− λ) is a scaled version of the true (unknown) b, which nonetheless can be
computed from (33).
By two runs of SLPME algorithm, we can get γσ and solve (33). However, the left hand side
of (33) does not allow us to recover the b˜’s separately and provides only one equation. Let us
denote the Equation (33) by `σ corresponding to the set σ. In order to elicit all b˜’s we need a
system of M :=
(
m
2
)
independent equations. This is easily achievable by choosing M σ’s so that
we get M set of unique equations like (33). LetM be those set of sets. In most cases, pairing
two groups to have trivial rates (through trivial classifiers) and rest of the groups to have rates
from the sphere S will work. For example, when m = 3, fixingM = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}}
suffices. Thus, running over all the choices of sets of groups σ ∈ M provides the system of
equations L := ∪σ∈M`σ (line 10 in Algorithm 1), which is formally described as follows:
Ξ 0 . . . 0
0 Ξ . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . Ξ


b˜(1)
b˜(2)
. . .
b˜(q)
 =

γ(1)
γ(2)
. . .
γ(q)
 , (34)
24
where b˜(i) = (b˜1i , b˜2i , · · · , b˜Mi ) and γ(i) = (γ1i , γ2i , · · · , γMi ) are vectorized versions of the i-th entry
across groups for i ∈ [q], and Ξ ∈ {0, 1}M×M is a binary full-rank matrix denoting membership
of groups in the set σ ∈M. For instance, for the choice ofM = {{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {2, 3}} when
m = 3 gives:
Ξ =
 0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0
 .
From technical point of view, one may choose anyM such that the resulting group membership
matrix Ξ is non-singular. Hence the solution of the system of equations L is:
b˜(1)
b˜(2)
. . .
b˜(q)
 =

Ξ 0 . . . 0
0 Ξ . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . Ξ

(−1) 
γ(1)
γ(2)
. . .
γ(q)
 . (35)
When we normalize b˜, we get the final fairness violation weight estimates as:
bˆuv =
b˜uv∑m
u,v=1,v>u ‖b˜uv‖2
for u, v ∈ [m], v > u. (36)
Notice that, due to the above normalization, the solution is again independent of the true
trade-off λ.
C.3 Eliciting Trade-off λ; Part 3 in Figure 3
Using the parametrization ν ′′ from (16), the metric in Definition 1 reduces to a linear metric
in s+ as discussed in (17), i.e:
Ψ(ν ′′(s+) ; a,B, λ) = 〈(1− λ)τ 1  a+ λ
∑m
v=2
b
1v
, s+〉+ c. (37)
We first show the proof of Lemma 1 and then discuss the trade-off elicitation algorithm
(Algorithm 4).
Proof of Lemma 1. For simplicity, let us abuse notation for this proof and denote τ 1a simply
by a,
∑m
v=2 b
1v simply by b, and S+% simply by S.
S is a convex set. Let Z = {z = (z1, z2) | z1 =< a, s >, z2 =< b, s >, s ∈ S}.
Claim: Z is convex.
Let z, z′ ∈ Z.
αz1 + (1− α)z′1 = α < a, s > +(1− α) < a, s′ > = < a, αs+ (1− α)s′ >
αz2 + (1− α)z′2 = α < b, s > +(1− α) < b, s′ > = < b, αs+ (1− α)s′ >
Since αs+ (1− α)s′ ∈ S, αz + (1− α)z′ ∈ Z. Hence Z is convex.
Claim: The boundary of the set Z is a strictly convex curve with no vertices for a 6= b.
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Recall that, the required function is given by:
ϑ(λ) = maxz∈Z(1− λ)z1 + λz2 + c (38)
(i) Since the set Z is convex, every boundary point is supported by a hyperplane.
(ii) Since a 6= b, notice that the slope is uniquely defined by λ. Since the sphere S is strictly
convex, the above linear functional defined by λ is maximized by a unique point in Z (similar
to Lemma 2). Thus, the the hyperplane is tangent at a unique point on the boundary of Z.
(iii) It only remains to show that there are no vertices on the boundary of Z. Recall that a
vertex exists if (and only if) some point is supported by more than one tangent hyperplane in
two dimensional space. This means there are two values of λ that achieve the same maximizer.
This is contradictory since there are no two linear functionals that achieve the same maximizer
on S.
This implies that the boundary of Z is strictly convex curve with no vertices. Since we are
interested in the maximization of ϑ, let us call this boundary as the upper boundary and
denote it by ∂Z+.
Claim: Let υ : [0, 1]→ ∂Z+ be continuous, bijective, parametrizations of the upper boundary.
Let ϑ : Z → R be a quasiconcave function which is monotone increasing in both z1 and z2.
Then the composition ϑ ◦ υ : [0, 1]→ R is strictly quasiconcave (and therefore unimodal with
no flat regions) on the interval [0, 1].
Let S be some superlevel set of the quasiconcave function ϑ. Since υ is a continuous bijection
and since the boundary ∂Z+ is a strictly convex curve with no vertices, wlog., for any r < s < t,
z1(υ(r)) < z1(υ(s)) < z1(υ(t)), and z2(υ(r)) > z2(υ(s)) > z2(υ(t)). (otherwise, swap r and t).
Since the boundary ∂Z+ is a strictly convex curve, then υ(s) must be greater (component-wise)
a point in the convex combination of υ(r) and υ(t). Let us denote that point by u. Since
ϑ is monotone increasing, then x ∈ S implies that y ∈ S, too, for all y ≥ x componentwise.
Therefore, ϑ(υ(s)) ≤ ϑ(u). Since S is convex, u ∈ S and thus υ(s) ∈ S.
This implies that υ−1(∂Z+ ∩ S) is an interval; hence it is convex, which in turn tells us that
the superlevel sets of ϑ ◦ υ are convex. So, ϑ ◦ υ is quasiconcave, as desired. This implies
unimodaltiy, because a function defined on real line which has more than one local maximum
can not be quasiconcave. Moreover, since there are no vertices on the boundary ∂Z+, the
ϑ ◦ υ : [0, 1] → R is strictly quasiconcave (and thus unimodal with no flat regions) on the
interval [0, 1]. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
Description of Algorithm 4:2 Given the unimodality of ϑ(λ) from Lemma 1, we devise the
binary-search procedure Algorithm 4 for eliciting the true trade-off λ. The algorithm takes in
input the query space S+% , binary-search tolerance , an equivalent oracle Ω(·, · Ψ ◦ ν ′′) with
metric Ψ ◦ ν ′′ as explained in Section 4.3, the elicited aˆ from Section 4.1, and the elicited Bˆ
from Section 4.2. The algorithm finds the maximizer of the function ϑˆ(λ) defined analogously
to (18), where a,B are replaced by aˆ, Bˆ. The algorithm poses four queries to the oracle and
shrink the interval [λ(a), λ(b)] into half based on the responses using a subroutine analogous to
ShrinkInterval shown in Figure 6. The algorithm stops when the length of the search interval
[λ(a), λ(b)] is less than the tolerance .
2The superscripts in Algorithm 2 denote iterates. Please do not confuse it with the sensitive group index.
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Algorithm 4 Eliciting the trade-off λ
1: Input: Query space S+% , binary-search tolerance  > 0, oracle Ω(·, ·,Ψ ◦ ν ′′) with metric Ψ ◦ ν ′′,
aˆ, Bˆ.
2: Initialize: λ(a) = 0, λ(b) = 1.
3: while
∣∣∣λ(b) − λ(a)∣∣∣ >  do
4: Set λ(c) = 3λ
(a)+λ(b)
4 , λ
(d) = λ
(a)+λ(b)
2 , λ
(e) = λ
(a)+3λ(b)
4
5: Set s(a) = argmax
s+∈S+%
〈(1− λa)τ 1  aˆ+ λa
m∑
v=2
bˆ1v, s+〉 using Lemma 2
6: Similarly, set s(c), s(d), s(e), s(b).
7: Query Ω(s(c), s(a) ; Ψ ◦ ν ′′), Ω(s(d), s(c) ; Ψ ◦ ν ′′), Ω(s(e), s(d) ; Ψ ◦ ν ′′), and Ω(s(b), s(e) ; Ψ ◦ ν ′′).
8: [λ(a), λ(b)]← ShrinkInterval (responses) using a subroutine analogous to the routine shown in
Figure 6.
9: Output: λˆ = λ
(a)+λ(b)
2 .
D Proof of Section 5
Proof of Theorem 1. We break this proof into three parts.
1. Elicitation guarantees for the misclassification cost φˆ (i.e., aˆ)
Since Algorithm 1 elicits a linear metric using the q-dimensional sphere S, the guarantees
on aˆ follows from Theorem 2 of [17]. Thus, under Assumption 2, the output aˆ from line 1
of Algorithm 1 satisfies ‖a∗ − aˆ‖2 ≤ O(√q(+
√
Ω/ρ)) after O
(
q log pi
2
)
queries.
2. Elicitation guarantees for the fairness violation cost ϕˆ (i.e., Bˆ)
We start with the definition of true γ (i.e. when all the elicited entities are true) from (33)
and let us drop the superscript σ for simplicity. Furthermore, let +
√
Ω/ρ be denoted by
.
γ = w1 
[
δf˘ − a (1− τ )
]
where δ =
2(1− τk−1)ak−1
f˘k−1

(1−τ(k−1)2+1)a(k−1)2+1
(1−τk−1)ak−1 −
f˜(k−1)2+1
f˜k−1(
f˘(k−1)2+1
f˘k−1
− f˜(k−1)2+1
f˜k−1
)
 .
Let us look at the derivative of the i-th coordinate of γ.
∂γi
∂aj
=

0 if j 6= i, j 6= k − 1, j 6= (k − 1)2 + 1
−τi if j = i
ci,1 if j = k − 1
ci,2 if j = (k − 1)2 + 1,
where ci,1 and ci,2 are some bounded constants due to Assumption 2. Here, we clip the
estimates at the lower bounds of the true entities from Assumption 2. Similarly, ∂γi/∂fj is
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bounded as well due to the regularity Assumption 2. This means that γi is Lipschitz in
2-norm wrt. a and f . Thus,
‖γ − γˆ‖∞ ≤ c3‖a− aˆ‖2 + c4‖f˘ − ˆ˘f‖2,
for some Lipschits constants c3 and c4. From the bounds of Part 1 of this proof, we have:
‖γ − γˆ‖∞ ≤ O(√q).
Recall the construction of b˜(i) from (34). We then have from the solution of system of
equations (35) that:
b˜(i) = Ξ
−1γ(i) ∀ i ∈ [q],
where b˜(i) = (b˜1i , b˜2i , · · · , b˜Mi ) and γ˜(i) = (γ1i , γ2i , · · · , γMi ) are vectorized versions of the i-th
entry across groups for i ∈ [q]. Ξ ∈ {0, 1}M×M is a full-rank symmetric matrix with bounded
infinity norm ‖Ξ−1‖∞ ≤ c (here, infinity norm of a matrix is defined as the maximum
absolute row sum of the matrix). Thus we have:
‖b˜(i) − ˆ˜b(i)‖∞ = ‖Ξ−1γ(i) − Ξ−1γˆ(i)‖∞ = ‖Ξ−1(γ(i) − γˆ(i))‖∞ ≤ ‖Ξ−1‖∞‖γ(i) − γˆ(i)‖∞,
which gives
‖b˜(i) − ˆ˜b(i)‖∞ ≤ O(√q).
Now, our final estimate is the normalized form of ˆ˜b from (36), so the final error in the
stacked version vec(B) and vec(Bˆ) is:
‖vec(B)− vec(Bˆ)‖∞ ≤ O(√q). (39)
Since there are q ×M entities in vec(B), we have:
‖vec(B)− vec(Bˆ)‖2 ≤ O(
√
qM
√
q) = O(mq). (40)
Due to elicitation on sphere and the oracle noise Ω as defined in Definition 4, we can replace
 with +
√
Ω/ρ back to get the final bound on fairness violation weights as in Theorem 1.
3. Elicitation guarantees for the trade-off parameter (i.e., λˆ)
The metric for our purpose is a linear metric in s+ ∈ S+ρ with the following slope:
Ψ(ν ′′(s+) ; a,B, λ) = 〈(1− λ)τ 1  a+ λ
m∑
v=2
b
1v
, s+〉. (41)
Since we elicit λ through queries over a surface of the sphere, we pose this problem as
finding the right angle (slope) defined by the true λ. Note that λ is what we want to elicit;
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however, due to oracle noise Ω, we can only aim to achieve a target angle λt. Moreover, we
do not have true a and B but have only estimates aˆ and Bˆ. Thus we query proxy solutions
always and can only aim to achieve an estimated version λe of the target angle. Lastly,
Algorithm 4 is stopped within an  threhsold, thus the final solution λˆ is within  distance
from λe. In total, we want to find:
|λ− λˆ| ≤ |λ− λt|︸ ︷︷ ︸
oracle error
+ |λt − λe|︸ ︷︷ ︸
estimation error
+ |λe − λˆ|︸ ︷︷ ︸
optimization error
.
• optimization error: |λe − λˆ| ≤ .
• oracle error: Notice that the oracle correctly answers as long as %(1− cos(λ− λt)) > Ω.
This is due to the fact that the metric is a 1-Lipschitz linear function, and the optimal
value on the sphere of radius % is %. However, as 1− cos(x) ≥ x2/3, so oracle is correct
as long as |λ− λe| ≥
√
3Ω/%. Given this condition, the binary search proceeds in the
correct direction.
• estimation error: We make this error because we only have access to the estimated aˆ
and Bˆ not the true a and B. However, since the metric in (41) is Lipschitz in a and∑m
v=2 b
1v, this error can be treated as oracle feedback noise where the oracle responses
with the estimated aˆ and Bˆ. Thus, if we replace Ω from the previous point to the error
in aˆ and
∑m
v=2 bˆ
1v, the binary search Algorithm 4 moves in the right direction as long as
|λt − λe| ≥ O

√
‖a− aˆ‖2 +
∑m
v=2 ‖b
1v − bˆ1v‖2
%
 = O(√mq(+√Ω/ρ)/%) ,
where we have used (40) to bound the error in {bˆ1v}mv=2.
Combining the three error bounds above gives us the desired result for trade-off parameter
in Theorem 1.
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